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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998), 
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the portion of the 
1992 Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act), 26 
U.S.C. SS 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. II), that required 
former coal mine operators to pay for health benefits for 
retired miners and their dependents, as applied to a former 
operator who last signed a coal industry benefit agreement 
in 1964. In this case, we are asked to apply Eastern to 
former coal mine operators who were signatories to coal 
industry agreements in 1978 and thereafter. Eastern was 
decided by a sharply divided Court, and the parties 
disagree as to what, if any, principles commanded a 
majority. 
 
The plaintiffs, Unity Real Estate ("Unity") and Barnes & 
Tucker Co. ("B&T"), challenge the Coal Act as applied to 
them as both a violation of substantive due process and an 
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unconstitutional uncompensated taking. Although it is an 
exceedingly close question, and we are highly sympathetic 
to plaintiffs' unfortunate situation, in which retroactively 
imposed liability operates to bind them to commitments 
they had thought satisfied when they left the coal industry, 
we conclude that the Act is constitutional as applied to 
these plaintiffs. Accordingly, their recourse must be to 
Congress rather than to the courts. 
 
First, we conclude, albeit with substantial hesitation, 
that the Coal Act does not violate due process. Our due 
process inquiry proceeds in two parts. We acknowledge at 
the outset that there is a gap between what the contracts 
between the union and the mining companies required and 
what the Coal Act now mandates from those former mining 
companies. Because this is a substantive due process 
challenge, we accord deference to Congress's judgments, 
based on the report and recommendations of the Coal 
Commission. While reasonable minds could differ on the 
point, we are satisfied that the agreements signed by the 
plaintiffs in 1978 and thereafter promised that miners and 
their dependents would receive lifetime benefits from the 
benefit funds, and that, at all events, these agreements 
informed reasonable expectations that the benefits would 
continue for life. Similarly, we conclude that it was 
reasonable for Congress to conclude that the plaintiffs' 
withdrawal from the funds contributed to the funds' 
financial instability, though the agreements themselves 
permitted withdrawal. The history of coal mining in this 
country also supports Congress's decision to step in when 
the funds that provided health benefits to retired miners 
began to falter. 
 
The question we must then answer is whether those 
congressional judgments provide enough of a rationale for 
closing the gap between the contracts and the needs of the 
benefit funds through the mechanism of the Coal Act. 
Consistent with our due process jurisprudence, we ask 
whether the Coal Act was a rational response to the 
problems Congress identified, taking into account the Act's 
retroactivity, which is highly disfavored in our legal culture. 
In light of Congress's findings and in the context of 
extensive government regulation of the coal industry, we 
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hold that it was not fundamentally unfair or unjust for 
Congress to conclude that the former coal companies 
should be responsible for paying for such benefits, even if 
they were no longer contractually obligated to pay into the 
benefit funds. The retroactive scope of this enactment, 
especially as applied to plaintiff Unity (eleven years), 
approaches the edge of permissible legislative action, but 
we cannot say that the law is beyond the legislative power. 
 
We also decline to find a compensable taking on the 
ground that the Coal Act will put the plaintiffs out of 
business, because it is contrary to the reasoning of a 
majority of the Supreme Court in Eastern. Moreover, 
granting relief whenever a plaintiff could credibly argue that 
it would be driven out of business by a regulation would 
create major difficulties in evaluating the constitutionality 
of much modern legislation. We therefore decline to 
construe this regulatory burden as a "categorical taking" 
analogous to the total destruction of the value of a specific 
piece of real property. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. History of the Coal Act 
 
1. Early Agreements in the Coal Industry 
 
The history behind the Coal Act has often been discussed 
in the pages of the federal reporters. See, e.g. , Eastern, 118 
S. Ct. at 2137-42 (plurality). Briefly, the relevant facts are 
as follows: The coal industry has witnessed a series of 
particularly vitriolic labor disputes over the past half- 
century. In 1946, motivated principally by miners' demands 
for decent health and retirement benefits, the United Mine 
Workers of America ("UMWA") called a nationwide strike. To 
forestall industrial paralysis, President Truman nationalized 
the coal mines. Following the execution of what came to be 
known as the Krug-Lewis Agreement, the government 
relinquished control of the mines. The UMWA and the 
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association ("BCOA"), a 
multiemployer group of coal producers, then executed the 
first National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement ("NBCWA"). 
The 1947 NBCWA specified terms and conditions of 
employment in the mines and, among other things, 
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extended the Krug-Lewis Agreement by providing health 
and pension benefits to miners. 
 
A new NBCWA signed in 1950 provided that, in exchange 
for union concessions, the BCOA would create a welfare 
and retirement fund financed by a per ton levy on coal 
mined by signatory coal producers. The 1950 Fund was 
designed to receive employer contributions and to use the 
funds to provide health benefits to current and retired 
miners (and, in certain cases, to family members). Several 
more NBCWAs were signed over the next two decades. None 
of them altered this basic benefits format, although 
beginning in 1971 the UMWA and the BCOA were given 
power over the levels of benefits provided under the 1950 
Fund, removing discretion formerly vested in the Trustees 
of the Fund. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 482 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
 
2. The 1974 Agreement 
 
In 1974, demographic changes that had increased the 
cost of benefits, along with the passage of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. S 1001 
et seq., led to a restructuring of the 1950 Fund. In its 
place, the 1974 NBCWA established four separate 
multiemployer plans, two covering pension benefits and two 
dealing with nonpension benefits. The nonpension entities 
were the 1950 Benefit Plan, which provided health benefits 
to coal workers who retired before 1976, and the 1974 
Benefit Plan, which covered those who retired on or after 
January 1, 1976. The 1974 NBCWA explicitly guaranteed 
that miners and their dependents would retain their health 
services cards--which gave them access to Plan health 
benefits--"for life." No such express warranty had appeared 
in any earlier agreement. We will discuss these changes in 
more detail below. See infra Part III. 
 
3. The 1978 Agreement 
 
In response to continued labor unrest and unresolved 
concerns over benefits, the 1978 NBCWA incorporated a 
new provision assuring health care for "orphaned" miners 
(that is, miners whose employers had abandoned either the 
coal industry or the UMWA), together with complementary 
"guarantee" and "evergreen" provisions. The "guarantee" 
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clause obligated signatories to make sufficient 
contributions to maintain benefits at the negotiated levels 
during the period of agreement, whereas before there had 
been no promise to maintain any particular benefit level. 
The "evergreen" clause required signatories who continued 
to mine coal to continue making benefit contributions for as 
long as such contributions were required by future 
NBCWAs, regardless of whether a particular operator 
actually signed those subsequent NBCWAs. Additionally, 
the 1978 NBCWA for the first time defined specific health 
benefits that would be covered, a practice that continued in 
later agreements. Finally, for miners leaving covered service 
on or after January 1, 1976, primary responsibility for 
retiree health care coverage was shifted from the UMWA 
multiemployer system to individual coal companies, with 
the 1974 Plan retained as an "orphan" plan for retirees 
whose former employers went out of business. 
 
4. The Coal Commission 
 
The economic problems that prompted the remedial 
measures in the 1974 and 1978 NBCWAs continued to 
plague the industry. In particular, the cost of health care 
rose steeply throughout the 1980s, the number of orphaned 
miners increased dramatically as more and more employers 
left the industry, and an aging population swelled the 
retired miners' ranks. By 1990, contributions from a 
shrinking number of coal producers proved insufficient to 
fund the four benefit plans, and those plans were awash in 
red ink. 
 
The UMWA struck the Pittston Coal Company for nearly 
11 months in 1989-90. The Secretary of Labor intervened, 
brokered a rapprochement, and, as part of the negotiated 
settlement, set up a commission to study the industry's 
problems and recommend ways of rejuvenating the benefit 
plans. The Coal Commission issued its report in late 1990. 
Congress's response to the commission's suggestions took 
the form of the Coal Act. The Act folded the 1950 and 1974 
Plans into a single UMWA-sponsored entity (the Combined 
Fund) and wove an elaborate tapestry designed to ensure 
that all retirees who were eligible to receive health benefits 
from the preexisting Plans would obtain them from the 
Combined Fund. The Act also created the 1992 Plan, which 
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was designed to provide benefits to eligible retirees and 
their dependents who were not beneficiaries of the 
Combined Fund and who were not receiving health care 
coverage directly from former employers. 
 
The linchpin of the statutory scheme is contained in 
section 9706 of the Coal Act, which directs the assignment 
by the Social Security Commissioner of every eligible 
beneficiary to a "signatory operator" who is still "in 
business." The signatory operator ("SO") must have signed 
at least one NBCWA and must pay premiums to the 
Combined Fund sufficient to defray the estimated 
annualized health care costs for its assigned beneficiaries. 
See 26 U.S.C. S 9704.1 A retired miner is assigned first, if 
possible, to the SO that both signed the 1978 (or any 
subsequent) NBCWA and also employed him for at least two 
years more recently than any other SO. See id. S 9706(a)(1). 
If no SO fits that description, the retired miner is assigned 
to the 1978 (or any subsequent) SO that employed him 
most recently for any length of time. See id.  S 9706(a)(2). If 
the retired miner never worked for a 1978 or subsequent 
SO that is still in business, he is assigned to the SO that 
employed him for the longest period of time. See id. 
S 9706(a)(3). 
 




Unity is a corporation owned by members of the Jamison 
family. Unity is covered by the Coal Act as a "related 
person" to several companies--formed by members of the 
Jamison family--that were ultimately absorbed into Unity. 
One, South Union-PA, had been mining coal since 1923 
and signed the 1947 NBCWA and amendments thereto 
through 1961. South Union-WVA, which took up mining 
when South Union-PA left off, signed the 1974, 1978, and 
1981 NBCWAs, although a bankruptcy court granted it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The law also provides that SOs must pay an additional amount, 
proportional to the number of initial assignments, to provide coverage for 
orphaned retirees. However, it has apparently not proven necessary to 
assign SOs responsibility for orphaned retirees because of the 
availability 
of other funding sources. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2142 n.3 (plurality). 
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leave to reject the 1981 NBCWA in 1981. Yet another 
Jamison company, Stewart Coal & Coke Co., paid into the 
UMWA benefit funds from 1949 to 1958; when it ceased 
operations, it stopped paying into the benefit funds, but its 
former employees continued to receive benefits from the 
Funds. Other related companies signed NBCWAs and paid 
into UMWA benefit funds at various times from the 1960s 
through the 1970s.2 
 
Unity currently owns a small commercial building and 
parking lot in Greensburg, Pennsylvania and employs two 
individuals, a corporate officer who earns $7,000 per year 
and a janitor. Its annual gross revenues are approximately 
$50,000 and its net worth is approximately $85,000. Unity 
was assigned 74 beneficiaries of the Combined Fund and 
owed the Fund, as of September 30, 1995, over $440,000 
in unpaid premiums. In addition, Unity was assigned 2 
beneficiaries of the 1992 Plan and, as of January 31, 1996, 
owed that Fund over $18,000. The assignment was based 
upon Unity's prior employment of 63 miners, who had 
worked for Unity and its related companies, on average, for 
ten years.3 Unity represents that its Coal Act liabilities are 
over six times its total assets and that, if forced to pay, it 
will be bankrupted. These representations are not disputed 




B&T was assigned 1544 Combined Fund beneficiaries 
and some twenty 1992 Plan beneficiaries. B&T had been, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. While attempting to distance itself from liability, Unity and its 
owners 
have not ignored the benefits of close corporate relationships. Although 
we do not suggest that it acted with bad faith, we note that Unity repaid 
the Jamison family over $230,000 from promissory notes given by 
Stewart Coal & Coke, which merged with Unity in 1969 (over $150,000 
on those notes was paid in 1992 and 1993), and that Unity sheltered 
$288,000 in income from federal income tax because of net operating 
loss carryover from South Union-WVA's bankruptcy. At all events, Unity 
has never presented any legal challenge to the "related persons" 
provision of the Act, and hence its obligations must stand or fall 
regardless of how Unity was assigned the beneficiaries. 
 
3. Thirty miners had worked for the companies for more than ten years 
and thirteen for more than fifteen years. 
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from 1905 on, engaged in large scale coal production until 
closing its last mining operation in 1986. It terminated an 
agreement to manage a mine effective January 1, 1987. At 
the peak of its coal mining operations from the 1970s to the 
1980s, B&T employed approximately 1100 UMWA- 
represented miners. B&T was a party to the 1971, 1974, 
1978, and 1981 NBCWAs through its membership in the 
coal operators' association. Although it withdrew from the 
association prior to the 1984 NBCWA, it later agreed to be 
bound by that NBCWA on a "me-too" basis, adhering to the 
Agreement's requirements. Its participation in the NBCWA 
terminated in 1988. At that time, B&T discontinued its 
individual employer plan and its retirees were left to be 
covered by the 1974 Benefit Plan (the "orphan" plan). 
 
B&T's activities are currently confined to leasing its coal 
reserves, paying workers' compensation and black lung 
claims, and treating acid mine drainage from its closed 
mines. B&T claims that if it is forced to continue paying its 
Coal Act liabilities, all of its assets will be consumed in less 
than two years, and this is not in dispute. 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
The plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Coal 
Act as it applies to them (S 9706(a)(1) & (2)). Both moved for 
preliminary injunctions to prevent the Trustees of the funds 
to which the plaintiffs are required to pay under the Coal 
Act from enforcing the Coal Act against them during the 
pendency of these cases. B&T withdrew its motion for a 
preliminary injunction, and the District Court granted 
Unity's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court 
rejected Unity's Due Process Clause argument but granted 
the requested interim relief on Takings Clause grounds. See 
Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 889 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. 
Pa. 1995). All parties moved for summary judgment. The 
District Court, reconsidering its views of the merits, granted 
the defendants' motions for summary judgment and denied 
Unity's and B&T's motions for summary judgment. Unity 
and B&T appeal. 
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II. The Eastern Decision 
 
A. The Rationales 
 
Eastern Enterprises was involved in coal mining until 
1965, and signed every NBCWA from 1947 until 1964. It 
was assigned liability for over 1000 miners, based on 
Eastern's status as the pre-1978 signatory for whom the 
miners had worked for the longest period of time; its total 
liability was estimated to be between $50 and $100 million. 
Eastern sued, claiming that the Coal Act was 
unconsititutional. 
 
Four Justices concluded that the Act was a compensable 
taking as to Eastern. In practical terms, this meant that the 
Act was unconstitutional: Compensation for the taking 
would be the return of sums required to be paid by the Act. 
Although the law did not work a physical invasion, the 
plurality noted that economic regulation can constitute a 
taking. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2146 (plurality). The 
plurality looked to three factors of particular significance in 
determining whether a taking had occurred: the economic 
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and the retroactive 
character of the government action. See id. (plurality). 
 
The plurality examined several previous cases to set the 
stage for its analysis. It looked to Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), where the Court upheld 
provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act, which required 
coal operators to compensate miners and their survivors for 
death or disability due to mining-related black lung 
disease. The Eastern plurality explained that Usery upheld 
that law because, even though "stricter limits may apply to 
Congress' authority when legislation operates in a 
retroactive manner," holding the companies liable for black 
lung benefits was justified as a rational measure to spread 
the costs of black lung to companies that profited from the 
miners' labor. Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2147 (plurality). 
 
Next, the plurality considered Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984), where the 
Court upheld the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments 
Act (MPPAA), which was enacted to supplement ERISA. 
ERISA had created the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
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Corporation to exercise discretionary authority to pay 
benefits when a multiemployer pension plan terminated. 
The Corporation also had authority to require employers 
who had contributed to the plan during the five years 
before its termination to pay for an amount proportional to 
their share of contributions to the plan during thatfive- 
year period. As ERISA's effective date approached, many 
multiemployer pension plans were in a precarious position, 
and so Congress enacted the MPPAA, which imposed a 
payment obligation upon any employer withdrawing from 
such plans. The obligation depended on the employer's 
share of the plan's unfunded vested benefits. 
 
The MPPAA applied retroactively to withdrawals within 
the five months preceding its enactment. The Eastern 
plurality explained that the Court upheld the MPPAA 
because retroactive liability prevented employers from 
taking advantage of a lengthy legislative process by 
withdrawing before Congress revised the law. The 
retroactivity in Gray, the Eastern plurality emphasized, was 
short, and limited to the needs generated by the delays 
inherent in the legislative process. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. 
at 2147 (plurality). 
 
The plurality then reviewed Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986), where the MPPAA 
was again at issue, this time as the subject of a takings 
challenge. The Eastern Court explained that Connolly 
upheld the law despite the employers' expectations that 
they would not have to pay, because "legislation is not 
unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled 
expectations." Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2148 (plurality). Even 
though the employers in Connolly had contractual 
agreements expressly limiting their contributions to the 
pension plan, the Court held that their express contracts 
could not impair Congress's authority. See Connolly, 475 
U.S. at 223-24. The Connolly Court noted that the MPPAA 
did not work a physical invasion. Although the economic 
impact of the law was substantial, the amount was directly 
related to the previous relationship between the employer 
and its pension plan, and therefore the economic impact 
factor did not establish that a taking had occurred. See id. 
at 225. Moreover, there was no interference with reasonable 
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investment-backed expectations, because at the time the 
MPPAA was enacted, prudent employers had notice that 
pension plans were regulated and that withdrawal might 
trigger additional financial obligations. See id. at 227. 
 
The third time was not the charm for the MPPAA's 
challengers in Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Construction 
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993). In that case, 
the employer focused on the fact that its contractual 
commitment to its pension plan did not impose withdrawal 
liability. The Court rejected the claim that the contract 
made a difference and reiterated its holding that there was 
no taking as long as an employer's liability would generally 
not be " `out of proportion to its experience with the plan.' " 
Id. at 645 (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226). Although the 
employer's liability under the MPPAA exceeded ERISA's 
original cap on withdrawal liability, the Court found "no 
reasonable basis to expect that [ERISA's] legal ceiling would 
never be lifted." Id. at 646. The employer voluntarily 
negotiated a plan within ERISA's scope, making its burden 
under the MPPAA neither unfair nor unjust. See id. at 646- 
47. 
 
The Eastern plurality summarized this line of cases as 
follows: 
 
       Our opinions in Turner Elkhorn, Connolly, and Concrete 
       Pipe[ ] make clear that Congress has considerable 
       leeway to fashion economic legislation, including the 
       power to affect contractual commitments between 
       private parties. Congress also may impose retroactive 
       liability to some degree, particularly where it is 
       "confined to short and limited periods required by the 
       practicalities of producing national legislation." Our 
       decisions, however, have left open the possibility that 
       legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes 
       severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties 
       that could not have anticipated the liability, and the 
       extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate 
       to the parties' experience. 
 
Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2149 (plurality) (citation omitted). 
The plurality held that the Coal Act, as applied to Eastern, 
presented such an extreme case. 
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On the economic impact factor of the takings test, the 
plurality found "no doubt that the Coal Act has forced a 
considerable financial burden upon Eastern," between $50 
and $100 million. Id. (plurality). The plurality referred to 
previous cases requiring that liability be proportional to a 
party's experience with the object of the challenged 
legislation. In the pension plan cases, the parties had 
voluntarily negotiated and maintained pension plans, at 
least for a while, and consequently their statutorily imposed 
liability was linked to their own conduct. See id. at 2149-50 
(plurality). Eastern did not participate in the negotiations 
for the 1974 or subsequent NBCWAs, nor did it agree to 
make contributions thereunder. "[The 1974, 1978, and 
subsequent agreements] first suggest an industry 
commitment to the funding of lifetime health benefits for 
both retirees and their family members." Id. at 2150 
(plurality). 
 
The plurality then concluded that the Coal Act 
substantially interfered with Eastern's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations. See id. at 2151 (plurality). 
It reasoned that retroactivity is generally disfavored in the 
law, and that the length of the period of retroactivity and 
the extent of Eastern's liability raised substantial questions 
of fairness. See id. at 2152 (plurality). Finally, the plurality 
found the nature of the government action to be quite 
unusual, because the liability imposed was substantial, 
based on conduct thirty to fifty years in the past, and 
unrelated to any commitment Eastern made or injury it 
caused. See id. at 2153 (plurality). 
 
The plurality declined to reach Eastern's substantive due 
process argument, although it noted that takings and due 
process analyses are often correlated. See id. (plurality); see 
also Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. The plurality reiterated the 
Court's past concerns about using the "vague contours" of 
the due process clause to nullify laws. Eastern, 118 S. Ct. 
at 2153 (plurality) (citation omitted). Justice Thomas agreed 
with the plurality's Takings Clause analysis but wrote 
separately to reaffirm his belief that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause would also apply to Eastern's predicament. See id. 
at 2154 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 
                                15 
  
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, providing 
the critical fifth vote to strike the law down as applied to 
Eastern. He found takings analysis inapplicable: "The Coal 
Act imposes a staggering financial burden on the petitioner 
. . . but it regulates the former mine owner without regard 
to property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified 
property interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by 
a property interest." Id. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Instead, he emphasized the law's distaste for retroactivity 
and found that the Coal Act's extreme retroactivity violated 
due process as applied to Eastern. See id. at 2158-59 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). When the Court upheld 
retroactive legislation in the past, he noted, the statutes at 
issue were "remedial, designed to impose an actual, 
measurable cost of [the employer's] business which the 
employer had been able to avoid in the past." Id. at 2159 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original). Justice Kennedy 
concluded that "[s]tatutes may be invalidated on due 
process grounds only under the most egregious of 
circumstances. This case represents one of the rare 
instances in which even such a permissive standard has 
been violated." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
Four Justices dissented, finding neither a taking nor a 
due process violation. 
 
B. Drawing Instruction from Eastern: Does It Control This 
Case? 
 
The splintered nature of the Court makes it difficult to 
distill a guiding principle from Eastern. There are five votes 
against the plurality's Takings Clause analysis. However, 
Justice Kennedy's substantive due process reasoning is not 
a "narrower" ground that we might take to constitute the 
controlling holding. There is a fundamental conceptual 
difference between a takings claim and a substantive due 
process claim. If the government pays just compensation, it 
may take property for public use under the Takings Clause. 
Due process protections, by contrast, define what the 
government may not require of a private party at all. It is 
the difference between a liability rule and a property rule. 
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
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Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 
66 (1986). To be sure, in this case the result of the two 
claims would be the same because the only potential taking 
is the imposition of a monetary obligation, but neither 
constitutional ground is a more limited version of the other. 
 
Amici, other former coal companies, submit that the 
holding of Eastern is that employee benefits funding 
legislation is unconstitutional if it imposes substantial 
retroactive liability on selected employers, and if that 
liability is unrelated to injuries caused or promises made by 
those employers. While this may be reasonably accurate in 
a general sense, it does not provide guidance for 
determining how substantial is too substantial or how tight 
the fit between parties' past acts and the liability imposed 
on them must be. Nor does it help define an intersection 
between substantive due process and takings law, as the 
word "unconstitutional" is here being used to cover, if not 
a multitude of sins, at least two. 
 
Eastern, therefore, mandates judgment for the plaintiffs 
only if they stand in a substantially identical position to 
Eastern Enterprises with respect to both the plurality and 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence. See Association of 
Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1254- 
55 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [ABC, Inc.] (reaching the same 
conclusion about Eastern). In addition, we are bound to 
follow the five-four vote against the takings claim in 
Eastern, although we will consider plaintiffs'"categorical 
takings" claim, not presented in Eastern, in greater detail 
infra Part IV. 
 
Because the plaintiffs signed NBCWAs in 1974 and 
thereafter, they are factually distinguishable from Eastern 
Enterprises. Language in the plurality and the concurrence 
suggesting that expectations fundamentally changed after 
1974 supports our conclusion. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 
2150 (plurality) ([The 1974, 1978, and subsequent 
agreements] first suggest an industry commitment to the 
funding of lifetime health benefits for both retirees and 
their family members."); id. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see also id. at 2161 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the miners' and operators' "implicit agreement 
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was made explicit in 1974"). Although we recognize that the 
Court was not presented with argument focused on post- 
1978 signatories and thus may not have had before it all 
the available evidence about later contracts, that very 
distinction compels the conclusion that Eastern is not on 
all fours with the case before us. 
 
To the extent that Eastern embodies principles capable of 
broader application, we believe that due process analysis 
encompasses the relevant concerns. We must identify a set 
of calipers with which to evaluate the challenged provisions 
of the Coal Act, and we believe that the relevant 
measurement is the extent of the gap between the coal 
companies' contractual promises to the Funds and the 
requirements of the Coal Act. In making our decision, we 
first give deference to Congress's determination of the 
problem to be addressed, and then ask whether Congress's 
solution comports with fundamental principles of due 
process. 
 
III. Retroactivity and Due Process 
 
A. The Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review when a substantive due process 
violation is alleged is forgiving; it bars only arbitrary and 
irrational congressional action. At the same time, our legal 
system has a long-standing and well-justified distaste for 
retroactive laws, because of their heightened potential for 
unfairness. See, e.g., Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2158 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (discussing our "singular distrust of 
retroactive statutes"); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
 
The situation is not unlike that faced in Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997). In Turner, a case 
involving a First Amendment challenge to Congress's 
regulation of cable systems, the Court applied intermediate 
scrutiny and required substantial evidence justifying 
Congress's conclusion that regulation was necessary, but 
nonetheless emphasized the importance of deference to 
Congress: 
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       Our sole obligation is "to assure that, in formulating its 
       judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences 
       based on substantial evidence." . . . [S]ubstantiality is 
       to be measured in this context by a standard more 
       deferential than we accord to judgments of an 
       administrative agency. We owe Congress' findings 
       deference in part because the institution "is far better 
       equipped than the judiciary to `amass and evaluate the 
       vast amounts of data' bearing upon" legislative 
       questions. This principle has special significance in 
       cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments 
       concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity 
       and assessments about the likely interaction of 
       industries undergoing rapid economic and 
       technological change. Though different in degree, the 
       deference to Congress is in one respect akin to 
       deference owed to administrative agencies because of 
       their expertise. This is not the sum of the matter, 
       however. We owe Congress' findings an additional 
       measure of deference out of respect for its authority to 
       exercise the legislative power. Even in the realm of 
       First Amendment questions where Congress must base 
       its conclusions upon substantial evidence, deference 
       must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be 
       avoided and to the remedial measures adopted for that 
       end, lest we infringe on traditional legislative authority 
       to make predictive judgments when enacting 
       nationwide regulatory policy. 
 
Id. at 1189 (citations omitted). 
 
While we are not applying a First Amendment test to this 
due process claim, we consider Turner instructive in a 
situation such as this, where both careful scrutiny of the 
retroactivity involved and deference to the legislature's 
judgments about cognizable harms and appropriate 
remedies are in order. We must decide whether sufficient 
evidence exists to support Congress's judgment that post- 
1978 signatories of NBCWAs could justly be charged with 
responsibility for retirees' health benefits, based on the 
promises they made to coal miners and on the effects of 
their departure from the industry on the Funds. See also 
Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 639 (Congress's judgment 
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receives deference even when its retroactive solution to a 
problem has some weaknesses). We will then evaluate 
whether it was rational for Congress to legislate to close the 
gap between the coal companies' promises and their 
contractual obligations, taking into account the retroactivity 
of the law. 
 
B. Does the Evidence Support Congress's Conclusion that 
the Coal Companies Should Be Held Responsible? 
 
1. The Relationship Between Benefits and Work 
Performed by Miners 
 
Before we address the problems occasioned by the mass 
departure of coal companies from the industry in the 1980s 
and the expectations created by the NBCWAs, we mustfirst 
dispose of the plaintiffs' argument that the Coal Act is 
unjustified because it charges them with financial 
responsibility for non-coal-mining-related health problems.4 
 
The plaintiffs submit that their liability is 
disproportionate to their actual responsibility because they 
are required to pay for miners' dependents and for all 
health conditions, however unrelated to mining work. Thus, 
they conclude, their liability does not depend in any 
rational way on benefits they received from the miners' 
work in the mines. That the company may be responsible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The plaintiffs further argue that there is no reasonable relationship 
between their potential liability and the former employment 
relationships; they are responsible for the miners' dependents even if the 
miners only worked for them a day. This argument is skewed. In fact, 
the miners for which the plaintiffs are responsible worked for the 
plaintiffs, on average, for many years. There is no evidence in the record 
to suggest that the plaintiffs' hypothetical ever occurred; instead, the 
evidence indicates that Congress correctly found that many beneficiaries 
were entitled to benefits based on miners' long years of service with 
particular companies. Furthermore, one day of work would not qualify a 
miner for benefits under the statute, since a miner must work for twenty 
years in the industry or be disabled in the course of employment to 
qualify for benefits. See 26 U.S.C. S 9703(f); In re Chateaugay, 53 F.3d 
at 489. In combination with the statutory scheme of assigning 
beneficiaries to the SO for whom a covered miner worked longest, this 
initial eligibility requirement guards against the disquieting result 
posited by the plaintiffs. 
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for a miner's entire family does not make the burden 
unrelated to past benefits, however. While it is true that a 
miner's virility may have little to do with his productivity, 
the post-1978 agreements clearly provided for family 
coverage; when those agreements were signed, the 
companies could predict, with some actuarial reliability, 
their responsibilities for family benefits. Coverage for 
dependents was the price of labor peace, and the 
companies received a benefit from the promise of that 
coverage. See Nobel, 720 F. Supp. at 1178. 
 
Proportionality does not require that the burdened 
parties have physically injured the beneficiaries of a 
retroactive law. The Eastern plurality relied on a 
concatenation of circumstances to find a lack of 
proportionality: First, the benefits were not related to work- 
related injuries, and, second, the benefits were not related 
to anything Eastern Enterprises ever promised. In Usery, 
the black lung benefit case, only the first factor was present 
and the law was upheld as proportional, while in Connolly 
only the second factor was present and the law was also 
upheld. Those cases demonstrate that the necessary 
proportionality may be of either type, and there is no need 
for both to be present. The argument to the contrary limits 
the coal companies' responsibility for their past actions to 
physical events. It makes more sense to recognize the 
relevance of the companies' promises and negotiations with 
the miners, especially since the NBCWAs were just as 
necessary to the companies' continued operations as 
blasting or digging. 
 
2. Responsibility for the Funds' Instability  
 
The defendants argue that B&T's and Unity's liability to 
the Funds is proportional to their general experience in the 
coal industry. The companies have only been assessed 
liability based on the miners they actually employed, and 
those miners' dependents. The Eastern plurality considered 
the former employment relationship alone insufficient 
because the employers had not promised lifetime benefits, 
at least until 1974, years after Eastern left the industry. 
See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2150 (plurality). Unlike Eastern, 
however, Unity and B&T, as BCOA members, at some 
points in time negotiated for and adhered to the very 
 
                                21 
  
agreements that established the benefit funds at issue. Like 
the employers in Concrete Pipe and Connolly, their liability 
is linked to their voluntary negotiation of a benefit plan, 
even though Congress retroactively increased the costs of 
that negotiation. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2149-50 
(plurality). 
 
Moreover, it can credibly be contended that the departure 
of companies such as Unity's subsidiaries and B&T helped 
to create the financial crisis in the plans that ultimately led 
to the Coal Act. When B&T, along with several other 
employers, left the industry, litigation ensued. See United 
Mine Workers v. Nobel, 720 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D. Pa. 1989), 
aff 'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir. 1990). As a consequence, the 
B&T retirees' benefits became funded by the 1974 Plan for 
orphaned miners. After these events, the Plan had to 
borrow funds and remaining employers were required to 
increase their contribution rates to make up the shortfall. 
Similarly, when South Union-WVA declared bankruptcy, it 
informed the Funds that it was no longer in business and 
would no longer provide health benefits for its retirees. As 
Mr. Jamison contemplated when he notified the Trustees 
that South Union-WVA had shut down, see J.A. at 170, the 
1974 Fund was forced to take responsibility for those 
retirees. See Schifano v. United Mine Workers 1974 Benefit 
Plan & Trust, 655 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. W. Va. 1987) 
(litigation arising out of South Union-WVA's bankruptcy). 
Thus, the plaintiffs' acts increased the burden on the Fund, 
contributing to its overstressed state, at least to some 
degree. 
 
Although the Fund may, as plaintiffs argue, have been 
financially stable when the plaintiffs left the industry, it 
was surely foreseeable that departures would lead to 
instability, given the benefit funding structure under the 
NBCWAs. While the plaintiffs contend that the benefit 
funds only became unstable after the plaintiffs left the 
industry and there were changes in the contribution levels 
required from coal operators who remained in the industry, 
it was also foreseeable that those contribution levels could 
change, and it was the NBCWAs to which the plaintiffs 
adhered that initially created a system vulnerable to such 
changes. It was thus rational to conclude that operators in 
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this position should bear some responsibility for the costs 
of the corrective legislation. "It is surely proper for Congress 
to legislate retrospectively to ensure that costs of a program 
are borne by the entire class of persons that Congress 
rationally believes should bear them." United States v. 
Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 65 (1989). 
 
The plaintiffs argue that holding them responsible for the 
benefit funds' financial instability because they left the coal 
industry would obligate every operator to remain in the 
industry no matter how unprofitable mining became, which 
amounts to an "erosion taking." We disagree, since this is 
simply a variant of the total takings claim that we reject 
below. The law does not require the plaintiffs to stay in any 
business, which was a necessary element of all the prior 
"erosion taking" cases. See, e.g., Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. 
Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920) (legislature 
cannot require a company to continue doing business, 
though it may require the company to fulfill its legal 
obligations if it chooses to continue operations). Instead, 
the Coal Act merely recognizes that all acts have 
consequences, and that sometimes it is not permissible for 
a company simply to walk away, leaving its former 
employees in the lurch. 
 
In ABC, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
relied heavily on the distinction between pre-1974 
participation in the coal industry and post-1974 
participation. The court found the distinction relevant for 
two reasons: the post-1974 agreements began the explicit 
promises of lifetime benefits, a matter we take up below, 
and also created a funding structure that allowed (or even 
induced) companies to leave the industry and slough off the 
burden of their retirees' benefits on the remaining 
companies. Before 1974, a company that left the industry 
did not create any obligations on the part of other 
companies to increase contributions to the benefit funds, 
but after 1974 that changed. Judge Silberman reasoned 
persuasively: 
 
       [I]t is surely rational for the Congress to expect that the 
       member companies' failure to contribute while their 
       retirees received benefits contributed to the underlying 
       crisis that the plans faced in the late 1980s. Although 
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       the coal contractors may not have been the dominant 
       cause of that underfunding, legislation need not 
       burden the most responsible party to survive rational 
       basis review. 
 
ABC, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1255-56. 
 
ABC, Inc. also found that Justice Kennedy's additional 
concern that liability imposed based on a past employment 
relationship should be "remedial" was satisfied for 
employers who, unlike Eastern, withdrew from the industry 
after the 1974 agreements. Such employers "withdrew from 
their prior commitment to contribute to the funds at 
precisely the point in time . . . at which the benefit 
obligation dramatically expanded, and therefore 
`contributed to the perilous financial condition of the 1950 
and 1974 plans which put the benefits in jeopardy.' " Id. at 
1257 (quoting Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 
Unlike Eastern, Unity and B&T, as BCOA members, 
participated in the negotiations that created the post-1978 
funding structure. They benefited from the NBCWAs by 
obtaining labor peace. Although the contract allowed the 
companies to unload their obligations to the retirees onto 
the Trustees, they should reasonably have anticipated that 
such a strategy would threaten the Funds and might well 
prompt a congressional response. We cannot say that it 
was irrational for Congress to charge the miners' former 
employers with the costs of their benefits, when the miners 
qualified for lifetime benefits from the Trustees because of 
their former employment (we expand on this point infra) 
and the employers' departure from the industry contributed 
to the problem confronting the Trustees. 
 
B&T and Unity urge that they are not responsible for 
most of the burden on the Funds. However, B&T was a 
large employer, whose departure from the industry added 
over a thousand beneficiaries to the Funds' "orphans," and 
its individual impact was therefore significant. In addition, 
Unity may be held partially responsible because, though its 
individual contribution to the problem was small, the 
aggregate effects of its actions and parallel actions by other 
companies contributed to the problem. Congress may 
 
                                24 
  
reasonably include all of the parties whose acts, taken 
together, gave rise to a problem, even if the individual 
contributions of each are small. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (applying the same reasoning to 
Congress's Commerce Clause power). 
 
3. The Background of Government Regulation  
 
We consider the background of government regulation 
significant as well. The coal industry has been heavily 
regulated for decades, including the government-imposed 
1948 Krug-Lewis Agreement, which created the basic health 
benefits structure. The companies had no reasonable 
expectation that the government would not expand its 
regulation of health benefits in the coal industry, given the 
history of labor unrest and government intervention. See 
136 Cong. Rec. S17814 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement 
of Sen. Glenn) (containing Congressional Research Service 
report on the extensive history of federal intervention into 
the health status and benefits of coal workers and into 
labor relations in the coal industry more generally).5 
 
The coal operators were also aware of the growing 
number of government requirements that vested benefits be 
paid, whether or not an employer was contractually 
obligated to pay for them, as the industry's response to 
ERISA indicated. The situation is thus analogous to those 
in Connolly and Concrete Pipe, in which the Court found 
that, in light of the history of federal pension regulation, 
employers could not reasonably assume after 1978 that 
their obligations to pension funds would never exceed the 
specific terms of their contracts, see Connolly, 475 U.S. at 
227, nor could they reasonably assume that Congress 
would not increase the statutory cap on ERISA withdrawal 
liability, see Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 646. The parties 
were well aware that pension plans could subject employers 
to retroactive liability in cases of underfunding, and could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Indeed, amicus LTV was the specific target of at least one bill to 
mandate that it continue to fund health benefits for its retired miners as 
early as 1986. See 132 Cong. Rec. S9879 (daily ed. July 30, 1986) (bill 
discussed by Sens. Byrd, Dole, Durenberger, Glenn, Heinz, & Specter); 
id. at E2714 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Rahall). 
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have foreseen that Congress might act similarly with 
respect to health benefits. 
 
4. The Contractual Language 
 
Turning to the expectations created by the contracts, the 
threshold question is whether we need to distinguish 
between explicit and implicit promises of lifetime benefits. 
Although the plaintiffs concentrate on explicit promises, an 
issue on which their position is strong, we think that 
explicit promises are not necessary in order to justify 
congressional action. The question is what reasonable 
expectations the coal companies' actions created. While an 
expectation cannot be reasonable without some foundation 
in the real world, an explicit representation that the 
companies would provide lifetime benefits is not required, 
since reasonable expectations may arise from a consistent 
course of conduct as well. 
 
Plaintiffs and amici argue that the coal companies never 
made any promises, implicit or explicit, or raised any 
expectations of lifetime benefits. They first point to the text 
of the NBCWAs, which did not themselves require the coal 
companies to provide lifetime benefits under all 
circumstances. They dissect the various contractual 
provisions and characterize their import as follows: (1) the 
health card that miners received for benefits"for life" did 
not guarantee any specific benefits; (2) the"evergreen" 
clauses only referred to an employer commitment to 
continue funding benefits, but did not promise anything 
about the scope of those benefits; (3) the "evergreen" 
clauses only applied to operators who stayed in the coal 
business; (4) the contracts allowed benefits to be 
suspended or reduced; and (5) the guarantee of benefits 
lasted only through the term of the agreement. Additionally, 
an UMWA negotiatior testified in the course of other 
litigation that everything was up for renegotiation at the 
end of a contract and that the parties could have agreed to 
eliminate benefits entirely. See District 17, UMWA v. Allied 
Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 126 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated, 765 F.2d 
412 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 
It is true that the funding contribution requirements were 
limited to the life of the agreement, "ending when this 
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Agreement is terminated," in 1978 and subsequent 
NBCWAs. Yet all of these arguments have the same 
fundamental weakness, which is that they go to the 
contract and not to the reasonable expectations that might 
have been created by the contract. The UMWA negotiator's 
testimony is a particularly strong example of this: the 
parties could have agreed to eliminate benefits in any given 
negotiation, but there was no realistic chance that they 
would. The defendants do not dispute that the contracts 
did not provide for the payments mandated by the Coal Act. 
If the contracts had so provided, the Coal Act would have 
been unnecessary. The plaintiffs' dissection of the contracts 
is a brilliant exercise, and were we deciding a case on labor 
and contract law principles the outcome would be clear in 
their favor.6 But this is not an action brought for 
contractual violations. We focus our attention instead on 
what conclusions Congress might rationally draw about the 
parties' relations and expectations, and what it might fairly 
do to close the gap between the contractual obligations of 
the coal companies and the Funds' actual liabilities. 
 
The NBCWAs did not in themselves guarantee that the 
coal companies would pay for lifetime benefits for retirees 
and their dependents. There thus is a tenable argument 
that the NBCWAs did not obligate the Trustees of the 
Funds to pay lifetime benefits, because the evolution of the 
benefit structure did not indisputably culminate in a 
lifetime guarantee. Indeed, the former coal companies have 
a number of strong arguments, and reasonable people 
could well disagree about Congress's choice to impose 
liability on them. Nonetheless, we conclude that Congress 
could reasonably have reached the conclusions it did about 
the expectation of lifetime benefits and about the coal 
companies' responsibility for the situation in which the 




6. However, not all of these arguments are persuasive even as a matter 
of contractual interpretation. As we discuss below, after 1978 health 
benefits were specified in the contract, and that the evergreen clause and 
the health card sections of the agreement did not rescribe the other 
sections of the contract does not mean that those specifications were 
without effect. 
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       a. Contractual Clarity 
 
The plaintiffs submit that Eastern turned on the fact that 
the relevant NBCWA provisions clearly did not provide for 
lifetime benefits. We believe that this is a subtle but 
significant "spin" on the plurality's view, which found that 
the obligations imposed on Eastern were unrelated to its 
contractual obligations. The plurality noted that, during 
Eastern's participation in the industry, retirement and 
health benefits were far less extensive than they later 
became; the benefits were also not vested. Furthermore, 
benefits were subject to alteration or termination with far 
fewer constraints than those later imposed by the shift of 
control from the Trustees to the BCOA and the UMWA. In 
fact, entire categories of beneficiaries provided for under the 
Coal Act were not part of the older NBCWAs, and"Eastern 
could not have contemplated liability for the provision of 
lifetime benefits to the widows of deceased miners." 
Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2150 (plurality). All these facts meant 
that there was no rational relationship between Eastern's 
past acts and its Coal Act-imposed obligations. 
 
If Connolly retains any force, as we think it does, the 
clarity of contractual provisions is far from dispositive. 
Connolly itself involved a contract whose limits were at least 
as clear as those in the contracts at issue here. Even 
crystalline contractual provisions, accompanied by well- 
established practice and understandings, can create 
reasonable expectations extending beyond the four corners 
of a contract. Though courts may be unable to enforce 
those expectations, Congress is not so constrained. We 
believe that our position is bolstered by a careful reading of 
the Eastern plurality opinion, which did not suggest that an 
implicit promise (that is, one not clearly found in the 
contract) would be insufficient to sustain the Coal Act if 
that promise had a reasonable basis in actual practice or in 
the penumbra created by contractual promises. Instead, the 
plurality found no evidence of any implied lifetime promise. 
See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2152 (plurality). Justice 
Kennedy, likewise, focused not on the clarity of the contract 
but on the lack of a connection between pre-1978 coal 
operators and retired miners' reasonable expectations and 
instability in the benefit structure. See id. at 2159 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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       b. Lifetime Benefits 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the NBCWAs never promised 
"lifetime benefits," and that the miners' only reasonable 
expectation based on the NBCWAs would have been that 
any operators who remained in the coal industry and 
continued to sign agreements would pay for their benefits 
indefinitely. From that perspective, the Coal Act 
retroactively transformed a series of three- or four-year 
commitments into an open-ended, decades-long obligation. 
 
The plaintiffs' reading of the agreements is too crabbed. 
The 1974 NBCWA has thirteen separate references to 
health service cards "for life" or "until death." Plaintiffs 
submit that this simply referred to a health card that no 
one would ever take away but that could be reduced to a 
worthless piece of paper at any time. However, not only did 
the 1978 NBCWA have sixteen separate references to 
coverage "for life" or "until death," it also refers to an 
"entitle[ment] to receive health benefits until death" in at 
least one section. 1978 NBCWA, Art. XX, at 116. The 
plaintiffs submit that this reference was inextricably linked 
to the references to health service cards. We agree, but 
think that the slippage between lifetime health cards and 
lifetime health benefits counsels against the plaintiffs' 
position: The lifetime health card may just as easily be seen 
as a shorthand reference to lifetime benefits, which may be 
why the parties did not correct (in this carefully negotiated 
contract) the reference to "benefits until death."7 This 
language, synonymous with the health card language, 
appears to reflect the bargaining parties' understanding 
that the lifetime provision of health benefits was an 
absolute requirement for any contract. See Nobel, 720 F. 
Supp. at 1175 (finding that the coal operators understood 
that lifetime benefit language was crucial to the ratification 
of any contract and that the BCOA therefore abandoned its 
attempt to remove such language). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The plaintiffs also note that the "benefits until death" language 
appears in a provision discussing restrictions on benefits whenever the 
beneficiary exceeded the earnings limit. However, the point of the 
provision was that the beneficiaries were entitled to benefits during any 
period that they did not exceed the earnings limits until death. 
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We do not rest our decision on the reference to "benefits 
until death"; rather, it is a datum supporting the overall 
conclusion that the health card was expected to guarantee 
benefits for life. The 1981 and 1984 NBCWAs continue in 
the same vein with sixteen references to coverage "for life" 
or "until death." While we appreciate the force of the 
plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, we are persuaded that 
it would have been reasonable for miners to expect that the 
"lifetime" health card actually meant that lifetime benefits 
would be provided to anyone in possession of a health card. 
 
Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the appearance of the 
phrases "for life" and "until death" in the 1974 and 
subsequent agreements does not imply any commitment to 
provide lifetime benefits. According to them, we should 
understand the lifetime health card as doing no more than 
serving the valuable administrative function of ensuring 
portability. At most, the plaintiffs argue, the possession of 
a health card merely entitles a retiree to whatever benefits, 
if any, were available under the NBCWA then in effect. The 
plaintiffs interpret "lifetime" to mean simply that, if an 
NBCWA were in place, miners could not lose their benefits 
after a fixed period of time (a problem that had arisen in 
the past when the Trustees cut off retired miners after five 
years or some other fixed period). 
 
This is a strained reading of the terms "for life" and "until 
death," which refer to persons (the miners and their 
dependents) and not to the continued existence of an 
NBCWA. Furthermore, this argument does not aid the 
plaintiffs much, as NBCWAs were in effect through the 
passage of the Coal Act and even to this day, although the 
plaintiffs are no longer signatories to them. There is no 
real-world difference between a lifetime guarantee and a 
guarantee that lasts while NBCWAs continue to exist, 
especially as the guarantee did not depend on any 
particular employer's continued adherence to the NBCWAs. 
The fact that NBCWAs continue is evidence that it was 
reasonable to expect them to continue, and thus that it was 
reasonable to expect that a "lifetime" guarantee, even one 
that could theoretically expire if the entire NBCWA system 
collapsed, was in reality a lifetime guarantee. Cf. D'Amico v. 
City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1998) 
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(reasoning that the occurrence of an event is evidence that 
a decisionmaker was justified in predicting that event). 
 
The plaintiffs further point out that the 1950 and 1974 
Plans contained language stating that, if assets became 
insufficient, benefits could be suspended or reduced. The 
Plans were incorporated into the 1974, 1978, 1981, and 
1984 NBCWAs by reference. Moreover, the plaintiffs note 
that the Plans were subject to modification or amendment, 
and there were provisions that would take effect"[i]n the 
event of the termination of the 1950 Plan." The plaintiffs 
also contend that when miners received health cards, they 
were specifically told that their benefits were subject to 
amendment or termination "at any time." 1958 Annual 
Report. Of course, later NBCWAs were designed to limit the 
Trustees' authority to do so, by defining the benefits to be 
provided, by establishing lifetime eligibility for a health 
card, and by eliminating the Trustees' ability to alter 
benefits without the consent of the union and the BCOA 
after 1971. 
 
But the NBCWAs always clearly stated that they were in 
effect for limited terms. The individual employer plans for 
health benefits that were established under the 1978 
NBCWA, like the 1950 and 1974 Plans, had the stated 
purpose of providing benefits "during the term of this 
Agreement." The plaintiffs conflate the issue of whether the 
coal companies' contribution requirements were "lifetime," 
which they clearly were not under the contract, with the 
issue of whether the contracts provided for lifetime health 
benefits. The lifetime health card was intended to put an 
end to the Trustees' pre-1974 practices of cutting 
beneficiaries off if their former employers were delinquent 
in paying into the Funds or if they had received benefits for 
a set period of time. Thus, the Trustees could reasonably be 
seen as required to pay lifetime benefits to all retirees and 
their dependents in possession of a health card; the 
contractual terms had the effect of binding the Trustees to 
a lifetime commitment, although they did not of themselves 
bind the coal companies to the same commitment. 8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The plaintiffs also argue that the Trustees understood that benefits 
were limited to the term of the agreement. When the 1974 NBCWA 
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Despite the plaintiffs' contention that the numerous 
cases holding that "for life" means lifetime benefits were 
wrongly decided, we are unpersuaded that those cases 
lacked support for their conclusion. See, e.g., In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 945 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir. 1991); 
District 29, UMWA v. UMWA 1974 Benefit Plan & Trust, 826 
F.2d 280, 282-83 (4th Cir. 1987); Grubbs v. UMWA, 723 F. 
Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Ark. 1989); Nobel, 720 F. Supp. at 
1178.9 The plaintiffs assert that, at all events, Eastern 
throws these cases into doubt. We disagree, because the 
Supreme Court said nothing about the Trustees' 
obligations, nor did the Court take up the post-1978 
contracts at all. 
 
Furthermore, contrary to the submission of the plaintiffs, 
these lower court cases did analyze the provisions of the 
contract, recognizing that the Trustees were obligated to 
provide benefits only "during the term of this agreement," 
just as the companies were only required to contribute 
during the term of the contract. Rather than ignoring this 
temporal language, the decisions found that other language 
in the contract, combined with testimony from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
expired on December 6, 1977, the Trustees stopped providing health 
benefits to retired miners, and the subsequently negotiated 1978 NBCWA 
prohibited retroactive funding of such benefits. This is significant, but, 
given that the benefit funds were fundamentally reconfigured at the 
same time to focus on individual employers, it would have been difficult 
to deal with those few months retroactively during the transition to the 
new regime. The short gap necessitated by the delay in negotiating a new 
contract during bitter labor strife does not disprove the general promise 
of lifetime benefits in the future. 
 
9. UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562 (1982), 
also refers to "lifetime" benefits. See id. at 565-66. The plaintiffs 
argue 
that NBCWAs were in place at all times relevant to Robinson, and so that 
case provides no basis for suggesting that benefits would be available in 
the absence of an NBCWA. However, this argument actually favors the 
defendants. We reiterate that we are not construing the contract but 
deciding what reasonable expectations it might generate. In that 
analysis, the fact that NBCWAs persisted for decades, although it was 
always possible that they would expire, favors the defendants, since the 
long history of NBCWA renegotiation makes the expectation that benefits 
would continue more reasonable. 
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negotiators, obligated the Trustees to provide lifetime 
benefits. See District 29, UMWA, 826 F.2d at 282. That the 
contracts may contain contradictory language does not, as 
plaintiffs and amici contend, make any construction 
requiring lifetime benefits unreasonable; instead, there was 
evidence pointing in both directions. Just as it was not 
unreasonable for courts to conclude that the contracts 
provided lifetime benefits, it was not unreasonable for 
Congress to rely on similar evidence, even though Congress 
could also reasonably have disagreed. In fact, we could 
even consider such judicial decisions, the earliest of which 
were referenced in the Coal Commission Report, as data 
justifying Congress's conclusion that lifetime benefits were 
promised, since Congress may reasonably look to the 
findings of a coordinate branch. See Coal Comm'n Report at 
3, 28, 47, 55-56. 
 
The question, then, is not whether the health benefits are 
truly "for life" but whether the former coal companies can 
justly be associated with the promises of lifetime benefits 
that by contract run only against the Trustees. The 
argument is that it was acceptable, by virtue of the 
contractual limitations, for companies to walk away and 
leave the Trustees and the companies remaining in the coal 
industry to pay the tab. And it is this underlying claim that 
we think Congress could rationally reject. In this regard, we 
reiterate that our obligation is to determine what Congress 
could reasonably have found. 
 
Congress certainly possessed credible evidence that 
miners expected those benefits. The Coal Commission, for 
example, reported to Congress in 1990 that 
 
       Retired coal miners have legitimate expectations of 
       health care benefits for life; that was the promise they 
       received during their working lives and that is how 
       they planned their retirement years. That commitment 
       should be honored. 
 
Id. at vii. The Commission based its conclusions on 
substantial evidence, including testimony from many 
industry participants on both sides of the issue. Even a 
dissenting member of the Commission, who was the 
president of a coal company, acknowledged that the post- 
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1978 agreements created a promise of lifetime benefits. See 
id. at 81 (statement of Commissioner Holsten). 10 Although 
the Coal Act's statutory scheme was proposed nine and two 
years, respectively, after Unity and B&T ceased to be bound 
by an NBCWA, and that is certainly a significant period of 
time, we cannot say that it is beyond the pale in light of the 
lifetime nature of the commitment at issue. 
 
       c. Other Contractual Provisions 
 
The negotiations of the 1970s took place in a changing 
legal context, as the Coal Commission's report to Congress 
recognized. ERISA made clear that employers who promised 
pension benefits were going to have to give them, and when 
the parties negotiated the 1974 and later agreements, that 
idea was certainly in mind. Moreover, starting in 1974, the 
new agreements removed the Trustees' discretion to set 
benefit levels and eligibility standards. See Coal Comm'n 
Report at 24. 
 
By 1977, anxiety had intensified, and the miners struck 
for nearly four months over, among other things, health 
benefit issues. The federal government intervened to settle 
the strike. The 1978 agreement introduced the "evergreen" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The conclusions of the Coal Commission Report are not rendered 
suspect by Eastern; although the plurality and Justice Kennedy 
concluded that Congress could not reasonably decide that pre-1978 
signatories were responsible for creating expectations of lifetime 
benefits, 
it is notable that the Coal Commission never proposed the "super 
reachback" provision challenged in Eastern. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 
2141 (plurality); Coal Comm'n Report at 61, 63, Supp. App. at 420, 422. 
The Commission's proposal provided for liability under what became 
S 9706(a)(1) and S 9706(a)(2), which only apply to post-1978 signatories, 
while S 9706(a)(3) was added late in the legislative process. See J. 
Atwood Ives, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional 
Testimony, House Ways & Means Oversight, Coal Workers Retirement 
Benefits, June 22, 1995. The Coal Commission'sfindings remain 
persuasive evidence from which Congress could conclude that signatory 
operators remaining in the coal industry after 1978 created a reasonable 
expectation of lifetime benefits among miners and their families. See also 
138 Cong. Rec. S5081, S5082 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. 
Boren) (referring to the expectations created by the 1978 agreement); id. 
(statement of Sen. Dole) (same). 
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and "guarantee" clauses and rearranged the benefit funds 
in major ways. See id. at 26. The evergreen clause only 
applied to companies that stayed in the coal mining 
industry. As such, it has no bearing on these plaintiffs 
except insofar as it expresses an intent by the negotiators 
to keep health benefits funded, as the miners expected 
them to be, in the context of growing burdens on NBCWA 
coal operators. 
 
Under the guarantee clause, signatory employers 
committed to make the contributions necessary to maintain 
the contractually specified benefits throughout the term of 
the agreement, even if that required an increase in the 
contribution rates specified at the outset of the contract 
term. This was essentially a shift "from a defined 
contribution obligation, under which employers were 
responsible only for a predetermined amount of royalties, to 
a form of defined benefit obligation, under which employers 
were to fund specific benefits." Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2140 
(plurality). The evergreen clause represented a similar effort 
by the bargaining parties to protect the funding base for 
ongoing health coverage. 
 
The coal companies contend that everyone recognized 
that, when the contract ended, the benefits would end. The 
1978 guarantee clause guaranteed benefits and provided 
for increased contribution if necessary only "during the 
term of this Agreement." The defendants respond that the 
"end of contract/end of benefits" equation is not the end of 
the story. They argue that it was reasonable for the miners 
to expect that the contract would be replaced by another 
contract, and then another, and then another, with at least 
comparable benefits, even if the industry and its 
participants changed. After all, that is what had taken 
place for the past fifty years: the slow but steady expansion 
of benefits. The NBCWAs, they argue, were negotiated in a 
context where the miners believed that, in return for wage 
and employment concessions, they would be able to 
guarantee their futures. In fact, as noted above, the 
NBCWAs have endured for decades after the changes of the 
1970s, evidencing the reasonableness of a belief that the 
agreements would continue. 
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We do not ignore the plaintiffs' history in the industry, 
which extended for many decades and ended over thirty 
years after Eastern Enterprises left the coal industry. Unity 
mined coal for 58 years and B&T for 80. Coal companies 
such as Unity and B&T received benefits from the steady 
expansion of health and retirement benefits, including wage 
concessions and union agreement to mechanization, during 
that period. Their long-term participation made it 
particularly understandable that miners would expect that 
the companies' adherence to promises of lifetime benefits in 




Our review of the evidence suggests that there are several 
plausible interpretations of the events leading up to the 
Coal Act. It could well be the case that former coal 
companies are not the most responsible parties in the 
deterioration of the health of the benefit funds, but 
Congress could also rationally find that they bore 
significant responsibility in setting up a structure that 
invited operators to abandon mining and shunt the burden 
of caring for retirees on other parties. Similarly, it could be 
that the contracts did not create a lifetime benefit obligation 
on the part of the Trustees, yet Congress had substantial 
evidence to the contrary. We will defer to Congress's 
judgments on the nature of the problem before it, including 
judgments about causation and reasonable expectations. 
The next question, therefore, is whether Congress's 
reasonable evaluations of the problem justified the 
corrective measures it mandated in the Coal Act. 
 
C. Is the Coal Act a Rational Response to the Problem 
Congress Identified? 
 
Given that evidence exists to support Congress's 
interpretation of the history of the coal industry and the 
NBCWAs, we must ask whether that evidence is enough to 
justify a retroactive law of this scope. For the following 
reasons, we conclude that the Coal Act's retroactivity does 
not render it irrational in violation of due process. 
 
1. The Length of the Retroactivity 
 
The heart of retroactivity analysis is an evaluation of the 
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extent of the burden imposed by a retroactive law in 
relation to the burdened parties' prior acts. We note as an 
initial matter that the length of the retroactivity alone is not 
dispositive in this case. The retroactivity is significantly less 
extensive than that in Eastern. We evaluate retroactivity not 
from the time the plaintiffs first signed an industry 
agreement, nor from the time the miners' right to benefits 
accrued, but rather from the end of the plaintiffs' 
contractual obligations to pay for such benefits. 11 For Unity, 
that period is eleven years, and for B&T four years, because 
B&T was bound by the 1984 NBCWA until 1988. This is 
substantially less time than the gap between Eastern's exit 
from the coal business and the enactment of the Coal Act, 
although, at least for Unity, it is still quite long.12 We 
conclude that this degree of retroactivity is not so extensive 
as to violate Justice Kennedy's standard, although Unity 
offers a close case.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We choose the expiration of NBCWA obligations because, although 
covered retirees may have stopped working for the plaintiffs before those 
dates, the contracts obligated the plaintiffs to continue paying for 
benefits until those contracts expired and, after 1978's evergreen clause, 
until the plaintiffs left the industry. This was not true of the relevant 
contracts in Eastern. Thus, the retroactivity extends not from the date of 
the miners' retirement but from the period during which the plaintiffs 
were free of any contractual obligation to pay for benefits. 
 
12. The retroactivity approved in Usery was actually much greater in 
some circumstances. The black lung law was enacted in 1969 and began 
imposing liability on employers in 1973. Yet benefits were given to 
miners who left mine work as early as 1923. See Usery, 428 U.S. at 40 
n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part). In addition, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. SS 9601-9657, has an unlimited retrospective temporal reach, 
which has yet to be invalidated by any court to consider the issue. See, 
e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
 
13. We focus on Justice Kennedy's explication of the relevant due 
process principles because the plurality did not reach Eastern's due 
process claim. See Rappa v. New Castle County , 18 F.3d 1043, 1058-61 
(3d Cir. 1994) (where "no single approach can be said to have the 
support of a majority of the Court," then "no particular standard 
constitutes the law of the land" and lower courts are bound by the result 
as applied to "substantially identical" cases). 
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Instead of relying solely on the length of the retroactivity, 
we assess the relationship of the retroactively imposed 
liability to the governmental interests asserted in its 
defense. See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (retroactive remedies must bear "a legitimate 
relation to the interest which the Government asserts 
supports the statute"); id. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
("[A] law that is fundamentally unfair because of its 
retroactivity is a law which is basically arbitrary."). 
 
The plaintiffs argue that retroactivity has only been 
upheld in three situations: (1) where the employer 
continues to operate in the regulated industry after the 
enactment of a retroactive law; (2) when employers would 
otherwise be able to take advantage of the delays inherent 
in the legislative process; and (3) where a worker's injury or 
illness is related to his or her work. This categorization is 
unsatisfactory. The first category lacks adequate analytical 
foundation. If a law is truly retroactive, applying to conduct 
completed before the law was enacted, it would seem only 
marginally relevant that an employer kept doing what it 
had been doing before, for the liability would be based on 
past acts, not post-enactment acts; the continuation in the 
old business would not seem to justify the retroactivity. If 
it would be fundamentally unfair to make a business pay 
for its long-past acts, it would seem equally unfair to put 
that business to the choice of leaving its established 
business or paying for its long-past acts. 
 
We posit a different standard: Where Congress acts 
reasonably to redress an injury caused or to enforce an 
expectation created by a party, it can do so retroactively. 
The ERISA and MPPAA cases establish that Congress may 
retroactively bar employers from giving their employees 
vested pensions in multiemployer plans and then leaving 
those plans to collapse. Those cases did not examine 
whether the employers continued to operate the same kind 
of business as they did when their former employees' 
pensions became vested. Our categorization also recognizes 
that workers can be harmed not just by late-appearing 
physical consequences of their jobs but also by an 
employer's failure to live up to a long-term promise that 
formed part of the worker's reasonable expectations on the 
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job. Both a promise of benefits and a job-related illness 
have a nexus to the worker's employment, as we discussed 
supra Subsection III.B.1. 
 
2. The Size of the Burden 
 
The amici (other former coal operators) call our attention 
to the size of the burden imposed, arguing that, because 
the Eastern plurality found that paying lifetime benefits 
imposed a "considerable" burden on Eastern Enterprises, 
by definition the same is true for all other entities required 
to pay benefits under the Coal Act, since the amount of the 
payment per beneficiary is the same under every part of the 
law. In Eastern, however, the total amount at issue was 
between $50 and $100 million, whereas here the total cost 
is well under $1 million to date for Unity and around $2.5 
million per year for B&T, an amount that will continue to 
decrease as beneficiaries die. Therefore, the plaintiffs are 
not in the same situation as Eastern Enterprises. 
 
We will not find a due process violation if the regulation 
is proportional to the harm legitimately addressed by the 
legislature. Yet the proportionality requirement will only be 
applied when the harm inflicted by the government is 
substantial enough to raise an issue as to whether a 
violation of due process has occurred. As the total absolute 
burden imposed by a statute increases, it becomes simpler 
for a court to determine that the legislature has exceeded 
the bounds of rationality, whereas a smaller burden means 
that Congress's error, if any, is less likely to justify the 
extreme sanction of invalidation on due process grounds. 
 
If, for example, Congress imposed a one-dollar burden on 
each member of some industry, and we concluded thatfive 
cents was the only amount that could be linked to 
Congress's asserted justification for the burden, we would 
still be disinclined to strike down the statute; the fact that 
the burden imposed was twenty times the actual cost would 
not be determinative. As the actual amount of the burden 
decreases, errors in its calculation increase in relative 
magnitude, but the leeway given to Congress in enacting 
social and economic legislation mandates that we look to 
absolute rather than relative magnitudes, so that our 
review is limited to those laws that work the most severe 
disruptions of settled expectations. 
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For similar reasons, we doubt that a former coal 
company would have a credible claim of "considerable" 
burden if it were only responsible for a small number of 
beneficiaries under the Act, even if the company was in 
such dire financial straits that the liability would push it 
over the economic edge. It is the aggregate cost--the total 
size of the burden imposed--and not the per-beneficiary 
cost that is significant under our due process 
jurisprudence. While the burden in this case is certainly 
substantial, and thus we will carefully scrutinize the Coal 
Act, the burden is not dispositive in itself. We acknowledge 
that the Coal Act will put these particular plaintiffs out of 
business, but that fact is again a matter of relative burden, 
not absolute burden and, because it does not determine the 
due process issue, we reserve our discussion of this 
consideration for our analysis of the plaintiffs' takings 
challenge infra Part IV. 
 
3. Proportionality and Congress's Ability To Go Beyond 
Private Contracts 
 
As we stated above, proportionality is the proper test of 
economic impact. The burden imposed on regulated parties 
may be heavy, but the Connolly Court found that a large 
burden is not unconstitutional if the liability actually 
imposed is not out of proportion to the claimant's prior 
experience with the object of the legislation. See Connolly, 
475 U.S. at 226; see also Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2150-51 
(plurality) (discussing the justifications for imposing liability 
as part of the analysis of the economic impact factor). Prior 
experience can consist of conduct that creates reasonable 
expectations about the object of the legislation or conduct 
that creates the problems that impelled the legislature to 
act. Given that the situation that impelled Congress to 
enact the Coal Act contained elements of both, we believe 
that the necessary proportionality exists. 
 
The Coal Act bridges a gap between the contractual 
promises of coal companies and the full extent of the 
funding required to provide retired miners with lifetime 
health benefits. The Trustees and the government argue 
that the companies' extracontractual acts, signalled by 
contractual language but going beyond that language, 
justify Congress's decision to bridge that gap. The 
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extracontractual acts fall into two general categories: the 
instability of the pre-Coal Act benefit funding structure to 
which the former coal companies contributed, and the 
expectation of lifetime benefits created by contractual 
language combined with the parties' consistent practices. 
As we have explained, we consider these reasons sufficient 
justification for the liability imposed by the Coal Act. 
 
As the defendants put it, the NBCWAs made a long-term 
commitment to provide health-care benefits but only a 
short-term contractual commitment for funding.14 They 
argue persuasively that this arrangement would be silly, 
even suicidal, for the miners and the funds were it not 
made in the context of a belief that the industry would 
continue on pretty much as it had been for the past few 
decades. Given this, we think that Congress could 
reasonably conclude that it would be fair to hold the coal 
companies to the implicit part of their promise, because 
when they left the industry the explicit part lost its 
meaning. See ABC, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1255-57. 
 
The Eastern plurality did not reject the Connolly principle 
that government may do more than require private parties 
to live up to their contracts: 
 
       [C]ontracts, however express, cannot fetter the 
       constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may 
       create rights of property, but when contracts deal with 
       a subject matter which lies within the control of 
       Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties 
       cannot remove their transactions from the reach of 
       dominant constitutional power by making contracts 
       about them. 
 
        If the regulatory statute is otherwise within the 
       powers of Congress, therefore, its application may not 
       be defeated by private contractual provisions. For the 
       same reason, the fact that legislation disregards or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. This disposes of plaintiffs' contention that the guarantee clause of 
1978 would have been superfluous if there were already a lifetime 
guarantee of benefits. The guarantee clause was an attempt to insure 
that the Trustees could live up to their obligations, an attempt that 
ultimately failed. 
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       destroys existing contractual rights does not always 
       transform the regulation into an illegal taking. . .. 
       [H]ere, the United States has taken nothing for its own 
       use, and only has nullified a contractual provision 
       limiting liability by imposing an additional obligation 
       that is otherwise within the power of Congress to 
       impose. 
 
Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223-24 (citation omitted); see also 
Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2148 (plurality). 
 
In Connolly, a contract limited the employers' obligations 
even if contributions proved insufficient to provide the 
promised benefits. The challenged legislation converted that 
defined contribution obligation to a broader defined benefit 
obligation. Congress enacted the law so that retirees could 
receive the vested benefits they had been promised and that 
they legitimately expected. The Court found a reasonable 
relation between the employers' acts and ERISA-imposed 
liability, even though the employers could not have foreseen 
a defined benefit obligation from the face of the contract. 
Here, the signatory operators created a benefit fund with a 
legal obligation to pay out more than the operators were 
required to pay in, just as in Connolly, and the Coal Act 
was Congress's attempt to close that funding gap. 
 
The plaintiffs distinguish Connolly by arguing that the 
problem in that case was that companies had made broad 
promises that the pension funds to which they contributed 
would pay pensions, but only obligated themselves 
contractually to pay a much smaller amount to those 
pension funds. The plaintiffs claim that, in this case, the 
promises that the Funds would pay benefits were narrow, 
because those benefits could be reduced or eliminated at 
any time, and the contractual obligations were broad 
during the period of their existence. As we have discussed 
above, however, Congress decided that even though the 
coal companies' contractual obligations were not broad 
enough to sustain the Funds, their promises that the 
Funds would pay benefits--made as part of the BCOA- 
union negotiations--were broad. This is a reasonable 
reading of the NBCWAs, particularly given that the 1974 
NBCWA removed the Trustees' discretion to change benefit 
levels without the bargaining parties' permission and that 
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the 1978 NBCWA began the practice of enumerating the 
exact health benefits to be provided. Cf. Nobel, 720 F. 
Supp. at 1180 (holding that benefits could not be reduced 
or discontinued by the Trustees despite the financial 
burden on the Trust). 
 
The Coal Act extended the operators' contractual 
obligations to include responsibility for the expectations 
generated and invited by the contracts. Essentially, the Act 
is Congress's attempt to do equity. We agree with the court 
in ABC, Inc., which wrote: 
 
       The constitutionally significant feature about these 
       later agreements is that they made it reasonable for 
       employers to expect a similar state-imposed duty, and 
       thus rendered such a duty, when eventually imposed, 
       not unfairly retroactive. That appellants could have 
       successfully defended a breach of contract suit seeking 
       lifetime benefits under the 1974 agreement is of no 
       consequence. 
 
ABC, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1258. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that it is implausible that operators 
in an industry with "very high turnover of employers," 
Connors v. Link Coal Co., 970 F.2d 902, 903 (D.C. Cir. 
1992), would have agreed to a perpetual funding obligation 
enforceable even against operators who left the coal 
industry entirely, whether for economic reasons (high labor 
costs, competition from other fuels, and the like) as B&T 
did or because they were out of coal. We agree that it is 
unlikely that the coal companies intended to create this 
exact funding structure, although modern employment 
relations often include post-retirement promises that may 
prove burdensome when conditions change for an 
employer. The crucial question, however, is whether the 
companies' actions, through the BCOA through which 
negotiations with the unions were conducted, created 
reasonable expectations about benefits and established a 
funding structure vulnerable to "dumping" retirees when 
companies left the industry. If so, Congress is not 
precluded from acting to redress the harms caused by this 
situation. 
 
                                43 
